As time and technology progress, how we interact with the world and each other becomes increasingly complex and articulated. The quantity and diversity of information in our environment, and the ease with which we can access that information and integrate it into our daily lives, have increased exponentially over the past decade. For many of us, the environment with which we interact has changed to make possible entirely new ways of working with information and being with others. Interest in these topics has recently been amplified by the advent of the so-called “Web 2.0”, a (continuing) expansion of interactive venues such as social networking, blogging and microblogging such as Twitter, and “pro/sumer” activities in which consumers of media content such as music and videos are simultaneously its producers.
Psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists have for some time been interested in the ways in which changes in our informational environment might affect us and our self-conceptions. The relevance of new technologies to our lives has attracted academic attention in large part because it appears to raise questions about how new kinds of interactions with others and our environment might alter, shape or otherwise affect our self-conceptions, our thoughts and other aspects of our cognitive, emotional and moral lives. And the project of ascertaining which properties of ourselves and our activities make essential contributions to our moral and mental lives and personhood is one in which philosophers are traditionally engaged. Yet these topics have, thus far, been relatively neglected by philosophers. This is especially strange when considered alongside the emphasis in recent philosophy of mind on the essential contributions that the embedding environment and our modes of interaction with it can make to our mental lives. If it’s possible that our informational environment and our capacities for interaction with it can constitutively shape our mentality and our moral conduct, we should consider whether radical changes in that environment and its interactive affordances may have implications for the character of our mental and moral lives, and perhaps for the sorts of persons we are.
What implications do new informational environments and affordances have for philosophical and ethical views of personal identity? What light, if any, can existing philosophical work on personal identity shine on the conceptual issues that arise when talking and thinking about agents, environments and interactions that span or blur the real/virtual and online/offline divides? The workshop will address these issues.
We welcome proposals for papers on the construction of personal identities online. Please submit extended abstracts (between 1500 and 2000 words, including bibliography, preferably in MS Word format) for papers suitable for 30-minute presentations to Dave Ward (D.Ward2@herts.ac.uk) by 31st of March 2010. Successful submissions may be further selected for publication.
Psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists have for some time been interested in the ways in which changes in our informational environment might affect us and our self-conceptions. The relevance of new technologies to our lives has attracted academic attention in large part because it appears to raise questions about how new kinds of interactions with others and our environment might alter, shape or otherwise affect our self-conceptions, our thoughts and other aspects of our cognitive, emotional and moral lives. And the project of ascertaining which properties of ourselves and our activities make essential contributions to our moral and mental lives and personhood is one in which philosophers are traditionally engaged. Yet these topics have, thus far, been relatively neglected by philosophers. This is especially strange when considered alongside the emphasis in recent philosophy of mind on the essential contributions that the embedding environment and our modes of interaction with it can make to our mental lives. If it’s possible that our informational environment and our capacities for interaction with it can constitutively shape our mentality and our moral conduct, we should consider whether radical changes in that environment and its interactive affordances may have implications for the character of our mental and moral lives, and perhaps for the sorts of persons we are.
What implications do new informational environments and affordances have for philosophical and ethical views of personal identity? What light, if any, can existing philosophical work on personal identity shine on the conceptual issues that arise when talking and thinking about agents, environments and interactions that span or blur the real/virtual and online/offline divides? The workshop will address these issues.
We welcome proposals for papers on the construction of personal identities online. Please submit extended abstracts (between 1500 and 2000 words, including bibliography, preferably in MS Word format) for papers suitable for 30-minute presentations to Dave Ward (D.Ward2@herts.ac.uk) by 31st of March 2010. Successful submissions may be further selected for publication.
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