Our relationships with electronic devices have become
remarkably intimate. In this paper, I’ll explain how, in our everyday
dealings with computers, phones, etc., we occasionally cross the line
between indirect and direct action. I’ll also explain how, in the
not-too-distant future, one might cross the line between gaining
knowledge indirectly through such devices, and gaining knowledge
directly through them. I’ll use the term “virtual embeddedness” for
this capacity to act directly on and gain knowledge directly through
some distant, external device.
In this paper, my main interest is to uncover how virtual embeddedness
relates to embodiment and personal identity. I believe that reflection
on virtual embeddedness and embodiment strains a traditional
materialist conception of ourselves to the breaking point. The
argument has three steps. First, I argue for sufficient conditions for
embodiment. Then, I argue for necessary and sufficient conditions for
what is naturally called “complete virtual embeddedness.” It turns
out, on these accounts, that complete virtual embeddedness entails
embodiment. Finally, I show how this makes trouble for a traditional
materialist conception of personal identity. Intuitively, it’s
possible for a person to be present in a place that is distant from
her brain or body – by being completely virtually embedded and
therefore embodied in some distant material object or device. (Think
of the movies Surrogates and Avatar, for example.) But, intuitively,
this sort of presence at a distance is possible neither for brains nor
for bodies. And so people aren’t brains or bodies.
remarkably intimate. In this paper, I’ll explain how, in our everyday
dealings with computers, phones, etc., we occasionally cross the line
between indirect and direct action. I’ll also explain how, in the
not-too-distant future, one might cross the line between gaining
knowledge indirectly through such devices, and gaining knowledge
directly through them. I’ll use the term “virtual embeddedness” for
this capacity to act directly on and gain knowledge directly through
some distant, external device.
In this paper, my main interest is to uncover how virtual embeddedness
relates to embodiment and personal identity. I believe that reflection
on virtual embeddedness and embodiment strains a traditional
materialist conception of ourselves to the breaking point. The
argument has three steps. First, I argue for sufficient conditions for
embodiment. Then, I argue for necessary and sufficient conditions for
what is naturally called “complete virtual embeddedness.” It turns
out, on these accounts, that complete virtual embeddedness entails
embodiment. Finally, I show how this makes trouble for a traditional
materialist conception of personal identity. Intuitively, it’s
possible for a person to be present in a place that is distant from
her brain or body – by being completely virtually embedded and
therefore embodied in some distant material object or device. (Think
of the movies Surrogates and Avatar, for example.) But, intuitively,
this sort of presence at a distance is possible neither for brains nor
for bodies. And so people aren’t brains or bodies.
Heidi Tiedke (University of Maryland): Persons and Their Lives
The Parfitian idea of something’s mattering in survival could be
thought of this way: it is the relation that can hold between two
person-stages that allows the earlier one reasonably to take an
attitude qualitatively indistinguishable from future-directed
self-concern to the later. Parfit argued that what matters in survival
in this sense is not the relation of identity, but only the relation
of psychological continuity. I say that what matters is the
continuation of the person’s life trajectory, something that involves
both continuity between the psychological stages in that trajectory
and the preservation of properties and relations extrinsic to the
person’s psychology. In contrast with the theories that what matters
in survival is identity preservation or mere psychological continuity,
I argue that my view of what matters can better explain our intuitions
about certain thought experiments, for instance, fission cases.
thought of this way: it is the relation that can hold between two
person-stages that allows the earlier one reasonably to take an
attitude qualitatively indistinguishable from future-directed
self-concern to the later. Parfit argued that what matters in survival
in this sense is not the relation of identity, but only the relation
of psychological continuity. I say that what matters is the
continuation of the person’s life trajectory, something that involves
both continuity between the psychological stages in that trajectory
and the preservation of properties and relations extrinsic to the
person’s psychology. In contrast with the theories that what matters
in survival is identity preservation or mere psychological continuity,
I argue that my view of what matters can better explain our intuitions
about certain thought experiments, for instance, fission cases.
Andreas Paraskevaides (University of Edinburgh): Real Agents
In this talk, I am mainly concerned with examining whether we can genuinely express our agency in virtual environments that involve our use of a constructed personal identity. I will present an account of agency that I believe can provide the basis for answering this question and for exploring the implications of our on-line interactions. The account I have in mind depends on the central idea that we can act as authoritative, self-knowing agents because we are able to live up to our claims of self-knowledge, i.e. our self-attributions. These self-attributions constitute our self-understanding, which enables us to justify our actions to one another and to be held responsible for them. Furthermore, our self-understanding and actions are regulated by our folk-psychological understanding of agency, and as such they fall under the normative constraints arising from the expectations and commitments that we share with other agents.
I take it that this account can help us elaborate on the nature of our capacity to express our agency in virtual environments. The more complex the identity we create in such settings, and the more widespread the norms guiding our on-line interactions with other agents, the more possibilities we have for genuinely expressing our self-understanding through this artificial identity. This seems especially true in settings wherein our interactions mirror to a greater extent our general social interactions that are also regulated by a shared folk-psychological understanding of agency. In such environments, our actions carry more weight and the artificial personal identities we construct become, in a sense, more authentic, as we grow increasingly motivated to live up to the self-understanding developed around these constructs.
I take it that this account can help us elaborate on the nature of our capacity to express our agency in virtual environments. The more complex the identity we create in such settings, and the more widespread the norms guiding our on-line interactions with other agents, the more possibilities we have for genuinely expressing our self-understanding through this artificial identity. This seems especially true in settings wherein our interactions mirror to a greater extent our general social interactions that are also regulated by a shared folk-psychological understanding of agency. In such environments, our actions carry more weight and the artificial personal identities we construct become, in a sense, more authentic, as we grow increasingly motivated to live up to the self-understanding developed around these constructs.
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